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THE GENETIC INFORMATION
NONDISCRIMINATION ACT OF 2008:
A CASE STUDY OF THE NEED FOR BETTER




The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) is the first
new civil rights statute enacted since the "federalism revolution" of 1995-2001,
in which the Supreme Court announced new limitations on congressional
authority. Among other things, these decisions invalidated civil rights
remedies against states, declaring that Congress had failed to amass sufficient
evidence of the need for legislation. Although passed in the shadow of these
decisions, GINA's limited legislative history makes it vulnerable to attack -
potentially limiting its protections for millions of state employees. States will
likely attack GINA on two grounds: first, that Congress relied only on its
commerce power, and not its Fourteenth Amendment remedial power; and
second, that Congress failed to identify a sufficient threat to constitutional
rights to justify subjecting states to suit. While there are strong grounds for
rejecting these challenges, that outcome is far from certain. The risk of
invalidation might have been minimized had Congress developed the rationale
for GINA's extension to the states more thoroughly, or alternatively, required
states to waive their immunity as a condition of federal grants. These strategies
are illustrated by recent proposed civil rights legislation addressing sexual
orientation discrimination and racial profiling, as well as by the Voting Rights
Act Reauthorization Act of 2006. To ensure the efficacy of future civil rights
legislation, Congress should consistently tailor laws to withstand federalism
challenges. Future laws should expressly invoke Congress's authority and
intent to create remedies against states; be accompanied by a strong and
targeted legislative record; expressly require waiver of state immunity; and
specifically enumerate remedies.
* Staff Attorney, Herbert Semmel Federal Rights Project, National Senior Citizens Law
Center. My colleagues, Simon Lazarus, Ian Millhiser, and especially Rochelle Bobroff, provided
invaluable comments on this Article, as did Mark Posner and Jennifer Mathis. I am grateful to




In spring of 2008, more than a decade after its initial introduction, Congress
passed the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 20081 (GINA) with
near-unanmirty. Designed to promote genetic research and preventive
screening, safeguard medical privacy, and prevent unfair treatment of
individuals based on disease-linked traits, GINA prohibits the collection and
use of genetic information by employers and insurers. Like other
antidiscrimination laws, GINA (which will go into effect in late 2009) applies to
private and public employers alike, and enables individuals harmed by
discrimination to seek damages in court. Yet because of GINA's limited
legislative record, courts could severely limit the new law's provision for
damages actions against states, cutting back the new law's protections for more
than five million state workers.2 Although Congress surely did not intend this
result, it could almost certainly have prevented it.
The threat to GINA arises from the Supreme Court's "federalism
revolution" of 1995-2001.3 In that period, the conservative majority of the
Supreme Court under Chief Justice Rehnquist took greater strides in limiting
the power of Congress than at any time since the 1930s, invalidating parts of
major federal laws on the basis of newly-announced constitutional rules
derived from the Tenth,4 Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments5 and the
Commerce Clause,6 and purportedly intended to preserve an appropriate
balance of state and federal power. Notable among these were decisions in
2000 and 2001 holding that two landmark civil rights laws, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), were unconstitutional insofar as they provided
damages remedies against state employers. 7
At the beginning of the Roberts Court era, the full implications of these
Rehnquist Court federalism decisions are uncertain, and are being litigated
extensively in the lower courts.8 The Court's most recent decisions in these
areas rejected challenges to Congressional power, 9 but most were decided on
1. Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
2. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT DATA: MARCH 2007 (revised
January 2009), available at http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/apes/07stus.txt (showing nearly 3.8 million
full-time employees and more than 1.4 million part-time employees at that time).
3. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 30 (2001).
4. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
5. See discussion infra Part I.
6. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000).
7. See discussion infra Part 1.
8. See generally Rochelle Bobroff, Scorched Earth and Fertile Ground, 2007 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
298 (discussing lower court treatment of the ADA); Tanya K. Shunnara, Reaction to Raich: The
Commerce Clause Counter-Revolution, 37 CUMB. L. REV. 575 (2007) (discussing lower court treatment
of Commerce Clause decisions).
9. The 2005 decision in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), which upheld federal regulation of
the intrastate production of drugs under the Controlled Substances Act, is seen by some as a retreat
from sweeping dicta in the Rehnquist Court's earlier Commerce Clause decisions. See Lino A.
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narrow grounds.10 Notably, in 2004 and 2006, the Court permitted enforcement
of the ADA against states in very specific classes of cases, leaving undecided
the question of whether the ADA's application to public services and programs
is within Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power in the majority of cases. 11
At the same time, the Court has indicated it may limit rights and remedies
under a variety of laws enacted under Congress's spending power.12
These Rehnquist and Roberts Court federalism decisions create standards
against which any major new Congressional action is likely to be judged.
Regardless of which party controls the political branches, these judicial
constraints remain, and could limit the effectiveness of not only existing laws
but future legislation as well. Ironically, even as the Supreme Court places less
reliance on legislative history in interpreting statutes than in the past,13 it has
given exacting scrutiny to such history in interpreting Congress's power to enact
laws, in effect "regularly check[ing] Congress's homework."1 4 As the first new
civil rights law enacted since the Court's "federalism revolution" began, 15 the
possibility of a federalism challenge to GINA illustrates the continuing
challenge this jurisprudence poses for Congress.
Part I of this Article summarizes in relevant detail the Rehnquist Court's
splintered, fact-bound and often contradictory decisions on Congress's power
to protect constitutional rights under Section 5 the Fourteenth Amendment,
including its authority to subject states to private actions for damages. Part II
asks how GINA stacks up under these precedents, concluding that GINA's
damages remedy may be vulnerable to attack in suits against states. State will
argue that the legislative record supporting GINA, and particularly its
prohibition on employment discrimination, is insufficient to comport with the
Court's precedents. Damages against states are most likely to be upheld in
GINA suits that seek to protect medical privacy rights, or deter race or gender
discrimination.
To some extent, the Supreme Court may have doomed GINA's application
to states by creating constitutional rules that render it difficult, perhaps
impossible, for Congress to respond to emerging threats to constitutional rights.
At the same time, it is clear that Congress did not do all it could to ensure that
GINA's remedies would be upheld. Part III compares GINA to three other
Graglia, Lopez, Morrison and Raich: Federalism in the Rehnquist Court, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
761, 780-85 (2008); Simon Lazarus, Federalism R.I.P.? Did the Roberts Hearings Junk the Rehnquist
Court's Federalism Revolution?, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2006).
10. See, e.g., Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 359 (2006) (upholding liability of states
under bankruptcy laws).
11. See discussion infra Part I.
12. See discussion infra Part III.
13. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices' Reliance on Legislative History:
Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 133-38 (2008).
14. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 558 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15. While the Voting Rights Act Reauthorization Act of 2006, discussed infra Part III, was the
first significant civil rights law to follow the 1990s federalism cases, GINA is the first since that time
to create new private causes of action, including against states. Prior to GINA, the most recent laws
to create new equal employment rights were the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, discussed
infra Part I, and the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994.
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recent pieces of legislation that illustrate more deliberate responses to the
Court's rulings. In the Voting Rights Act Reauthorization Act of 2006 - the
constitutionality of which is currently before the Supreme Court - Congress
conducted extensive fact-finding to justify the legislation. The proposed End
Racial Profiling Act takes a similar approach, with statutory findings that
specifically justify regulation of state governments in the name of a variety of
constitutional rights. A different approach is illustrated by the proposed
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), which would require states to
waive their immunity from claims of sexual orientation discrimination in order
to remain eligible for federal grants. These comparisons show that Congress
has been inconsistent in addressing the impact of the Court's rulings, giving
them careful attention in drafting some legislation- particularly high-priority
or controversial legislation - but little attention in other legislation such as
GINA.
Part IV concludes by suggesting how lawmakers can respond more
effectively to the Court's federalism jurisprudence. Congress (and policy
advocates) should consistently take the Court's rulings into account when
crafting new civil rights legislation, by (1) expressly invoking Congress's
authority and intent to create remedies against states; (2) developing a strong
legislative record that focuses on threats to constitutional rights; (3) laying out
arguments for why legislation is needed and complies with the Court's
precedents; (4) expressly requiring waiver of state immunity in exchange for
federal funds; and (5) specifically enumerating individual remedies. Because
even these steps may not always be adequate, however, Congress should also
use its oversight and confirmation powers and other means to promote a
judicial approach that gives more respect to the constitutional authority and
prerogatives of Congress.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S SECTION FIvE JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Intersection of the Section Five Power and Sovereign Immunity
The constitutional questions facing GINA arise from the intersection of two
of the Court's federalism doctrines. The first is state "sovereign immunity"
under the Eleventh Amendment, which the Rehnquist Court interpreted
expansively as a general bar to damages suits against states.16 In 1996, the
Court's five most conservative justices held-overruling a six-year-old
precedent-that Congress cannot use its commerce power, or its other Article I
powers, to abrogate states' sovereign immunity.17 The same majority later held
16. The Eleventh Amendment provides that a state cannot be sued in federal court by citizens
of another state or a foreign country, U.S. CONST. amend. XI, but Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
held that "the scope of the States' immunity from suit is demarcated not by the text of the
Amendment alone but by fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design." Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 729 (1999).
17. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)). See also Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say.
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that this immunity extends to all claims for damages, in both federal and state
court, as well as in federal agency proceedings. 18  The four dissenters
characterized this approach to sovereign immunity as a "shocking... affront to
a coequal branch of our Government," 19 and one without basis in precedent or
the constitutional design.20 While this immunity does not bar injunctive relief,
the elimination of damages remedies - such as back pay for illegal firings -
erodes a law's remedial and deterrent effects. 21
The second relevant doctrine is the Rehnquist Court's restrictive
interpretation of Congress's authority to protect constitutional rights under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 22 The seeds of this approach lay in the
Court's 1997 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,23 which was primarily a case
about the bounds of the Free Exercise Clause and Congress's power (or rather,
its lack of power) to expand the substantive scope of constitutional
protections.24  Boerne also held, with relatively little discussion, that the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was not a proper use of Congress's
§ 5 power to remedy and deter constitutional violations. The Court stated
generally that under § 5 "there must be a congruence between the means used
and the ends to be achieved," and observed that Congress had not documented
any instance of deliberate religious discrimination in state law in modem
times.25 But the "lack of support in the legislative record ... [was] not RFRA's
most serious shortcoming," the Court said, because in general "it is for
Congress to determine the method by which it will reach a decision." 26 Rather,
RFRA failed as a § 5 remedy because it was clearly intended to alter existing
constitutional protections, and "not designed to identify and counteract state
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (rejecting Patent Clause as basis for abrogation); but see Katz, 546 U.S. at
359 (recognizing Bankruptcy Clause as a narrow exception). The Seminole Tribe majority consisted of
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the recently-appointed Justice Thomas, and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy
and Scalia. Prior to these decisions, the Court had struggled for decades to define the scope of
states' immunity from suit and legislative exceptions to it. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 522-55 (3d ed. 2000).
18. Alden, 527 U.S. at 706; Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743
(2002).
19. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 100-168 (Souter, J., dissenting).
21. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment, Irreparable Injury, and
Section 1983, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1326 (2001) (immunity "deprives private parties of an adequate
remedy at law for conceded violations of their rights"); Carlos M. Vazquez, Eleventh Amendment
Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 875 (2000) (noting that availability of only prospective
relief can lead to numerous, temporary violations of federal law).
22. In previous decades, the Supreme Court broadly construed Congress's power to remedy
and deter constitutional violations under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112 (1970); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448 (1980).
23. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
24. Id. at 532. That the Court did not think it was breaking new ground regarding the § 5 power
is apparent from the fact that all of the four concurring and dissenting opinions in the case are
focused on the substantive scope of the Religion Clauses. Id. at 536-67.
25. Id. at 530.
26. Id. at 531-32.
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laws likely to be unconstitutional." 27 Despite the limited nature of the § 5
analysis in Boerne, however, the same five-justice majority that expanded the
Court's immunity doctrine would also employ Boerne's "congruence and
proportionality" formulation as a sharp limitation on congressional power. 28
These two doctrines interlock, because the Court's immunity decisions left
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as the only basis for Congress to abrogate
state sovereign immunity,29 and thereby enable damages actions under
generally-applicable civil rights laws like GINA. 30 The rest of this Part lays out
the principles from recent case law under which GINA's abrogation of
sovereign immunity will likely be tested. These cases have been decided by
shifting majorities over fierce dissents, and display "major methodological
contradictions." 31 Earlier cases appear to set up a strict test, to which later
cases, decided by different majorities, arguably pay only lip service. The Court
may well swing back in the other direction in the future- especially given the
replacement of the swing voters in those cases by the conservative Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito.32 For present purposes, I seek to synthesize these
conflicting decisions, acknowledging their considerable indeterminacy and the
fact that the Supreme Court may change the game yet again.33
B. Congressional Intent and the Source ofAuthority for Abrogation
Before deciding whether Congress has properly employed its § 5 power to
abrogate state immunity, it must be clear that Congress intended to abrogate
immunity. The Court has said that this clear-intent rule is generally satisfied
when a statute, by its plain terms, applies to state as well as non-state actors.34
27. Id. at 534.
28. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Federalism's Paradox: The Spending Power and Waiver of Sovereign
Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141, 153 (2002). Regarding RFRA's successor statute, the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, see discussion infra Part III.
29. Along with the similar enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
30. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 452-56). As noted supra,
injunctive remedies are available even in the absence of abrogation. Additionally, as discussed infra
Part III, Congress may induce states to waive their immunity in exchange for federal funds.
31. Vikram David Amar, The New "New Federalism," 6 GREEN BAG 349, 351 (2003).
32. Rochelle Bobroff, The Early Roberts Court Attacks Congress's Power to Protect Civil Rights, 30
N.C. CENT. L. REV. 231, 262 (2008); see also William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power After Tennessee v.
Lane, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 39, 88 (2004) (suggesting, prior to the 2005 Supreme Court appointments, that
whether Lane marks a real shift or only a temporary pause in the Court's limitations on § 5
authority will depend on changes in the Court's composition).
33. Two points of § 5 doctrine are clear and likely to stay that way: in 2006, the Court
unanimously held that Congress may always provide remedies in cases involving actual
constitutional violations. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158 (2006). Under Georgia, courts
must decide "on a claim-by-claim basis" whether a violation of a purported § 5 statute would also
violate the Constitution, in which case further § 5 analysis is unnecessary. Id. at 160. The Court is
also unanimous in the view that § 5 legislation may not respond to purely private action, though it
is split on whether Congress has the power to provide remedies against private actors in response
to states' failure to protect them. Compare Morrison, 529 U.S. at 624-27, with id. at 664-66 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
34. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73-74 (2000). See also Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S.
223, 233 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (statutory text need not make "explicit reference to state
sovereign immunity or the Eleventh Amendment").
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The Court has also said that Congress does not need to identify the source of
constitutional authority for passing § 5 legislation.35 Rather, it is only necessary
that a court "be able to discern some legislative purpose or factual predicate
that supports the exercise of that power."
36
Yet the Court has made one statement that seemed to contradict this
principle. In Florida Prepaid, the Court refused to even consider whether a
patent law was a proper use of the § 5 power to enforce the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, even though the law expressly provided for suits against
states.3 7 Noting the absence of any mention of the Fifth Amendment in the
statute or legislative history, the Court stated that because "Congress was so
explicit about [relying on] its commerce power and [its power under § 5 to
protect] due process guarantees as bases for the Act," Congress's failure to
mention the Fifth Amendment precluded the Court from even considering it.38
Some lower courts have read the footnote as establishing a broad rule that
reliance by Congress on one or more powers to enact a law precludes the Court
from upholding it on the basis of some other power.39
But there is good reason to read this footnote narrowly. Its briefly stated
conclusion, without citation, should not likely be taken to limit or overrule
long-established principles. Moreover, in the very next term after writing this
footnote, the Court rejected an invitation to extend it in Kimel. Asserting
immunity from liability under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), the respondents seized on the Florida Prepaid footnote, arguing the
ADEA could not be upheld as § 5 legislation because its legislative record and
statutory findings focused entirely on interstate commerce effects and did not
invoke the Equal Protection Clause.40 This argument received substantial
discussion in the briefs,4 1 yet the Court did not even address it in its decision in
35. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 476-478 (upholding minority business set-aside provisions as a
valid exercise of Congress's § 5 power in the absence of an express recitation stating which power
Congress believed it was exercising). See also Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948)
(the "constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which
it undertakes to exercise").
36. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983). The Wyoming Court specifically rejected
the suggestion that such a recitation was required by language in Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1 (1981), stating that the Court "should not quickly attribute to Congress an unstated intent
to act under its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment." Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 243 n.18
(quoting Halderman, 451 U.S. at 16).
37. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642 n.7.
38. Id.
39. See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 604-05 (5th Cir. 2000) (suggesting reliance on
commerce power precludes analysis of Copyright Remedy Act under § 5); De Romero v. Inst. of
Puerto Rican Culture, 466 F.Supp.2d 410, 416 (D.Puerto Rico 2006) (same); see also Chittister v. Dep't
of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d 223, 228 n.3 (3d. Cir. 2000) (opinion of Alito, J.) (refusing to consider
Family and Medical Leave Act as remedy for due process rights in light of Congress's reliance on
Equal Protection Clause).
40. Brief for Respondents at 27-30, Kimel, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (No. 98-796).
41. See Brief for Petitioners J. Daniel Kimel, Jr., et al. at 29 n.18, Kimel, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (No. 98-
796) (stating general rule that recitals are unnecessary when the application of the substantive terms
of the legislation is unambiguous); Brief for United States at 18 n.18, Kimel, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (No.
98-796) (same); Reply Brief for Petitioners J. Daniel Kimel, Jr., et al. at 7-8 (characterizing footnote as
reflecting a "rule of judicial deference" that "cannot.. .be leveraged into an affirmative judicial
2009]
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Kimel, instead holding that the ADEA clearly sought to abrogate immunity and
evaluating the statute as § 5 legislation.42 This strongly suggests that the Court
viewed Florida Prepaid as distinguishable.
The best explanation for distinguishing Florida Prepaid comes from the
Solicitor General's brief in Kimel, which argued that that in Florida Prepaid the
Court simply deferred to Congress's statements regarding its bases for
legislation because no other constitutional basis was obvious from the
legislation itself. By contrast, "the connection between [an] anti-discrimination
statute and the enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause is obvious." 43 This
reading reconciles Florida Prepaid not only with Kimel but with earlier case law,
so that any nondiscrimination law that expressly applies to states -including
GINA-may be evaluated as § 5 legislation.
C. Legislative Record: The Strict Kimel/Garrett Standard
Under the post-Boerne cases, the first step for judging the validity of § 5
legislation is determining whether Congress identified a sufficient threat to
constitutional rights to justify a congressional response. In Florida Prepaid, the
Court's majority indicated that Congress must identify a pattern of
"widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights"44-language
Boerne had used to describe the basis for 1960s civil rights laws, but which was
now framed as the operative § 5 standard. The Court held that the Patent
Remedy Clarification Act did not meet this standard because it was enacted "in
response to a handful of instances of state patent infringement that do not
necessarily violate the Constitution." 45 The Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
stated, cannot be used to address such a "speculative harm."46
The Court appeared to make this standard even stricter in Kimel, ignoring
Boerne's statement about deferring to "the method by which [Congress] will
reach a decision,"47 and closely scrutinizing the legislative record supporting
the ADEA.48 Although this record was substantial, the Court held that § 5
legislation cannot be buttressed by a pattern of discriminatory action in the
private sector. Rejecting abrogation of immunity under the ADEA, the Court
declared that the fact "that Congress found substantial age discrimination in the
requirement that Congress must state the constitutional predicate of its legislation at the pain of
having the courts declare the enactment unconstitutional"); Reply Brief for the United States at 16
n.16, Kimel, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (No. 98-796) (distinguishing Florida Prepaid on ground that the
ADEA's nature as an anti-discrimination statute).
42. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73-74.
43. Reply Brief for the United States at 16 n.16, Kimel, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (No. 98-796). See also
CSX Transp., Inc. v. NY State Office of Real Prop. Servs., 306 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2002) (abrogation
under Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act valid despite express reliance on
Commerce Clause and failure to mention § 5 power, where "the discriminatory conduct that the
[statute] attempts to regulate can be easily associated with Section 5 powers").
44. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645.
45. Id. at 646.
46. Id. at 641.
47. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
48. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89-90.
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private sector ... is beside the point," because "Congress made no such
findings with respect to the States."4 9 Similarly, in reviewing the ADA's
employment discrimination provisions in Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett,50 the Court faulted Congress for focusing on private-sector
discrimination, while producing only "half a dozen examples" of disability
discrimination by states.51 These isolated incidents, the Court held, fell "far
short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on
which § 5 legislation must be based."52
These cases also refused to consider several other categories of evidence
relied by Congress, rejecting as irrelevant: 1) evidence relating to the actions
taken by local and federal government agencies, on the grounds that they were
not relevant to abrogation of state sovereign immunity;53 2) evidence of state
action that was not clearly unconstitutional, on the grounds that Congress
lacked the power under § 5 to deter activity permitted by the Constitution;54 3)
evidence unrelated to the specific context at issue, e.g., evidence of
discrimination in public services to support remedies in employment;55 and 4)
evidence outside the Congressional record.56 Together, these restrictions on the
kinds of evidence that could support § 5 legislation suggested a dauntingly
high bar: Congress could not simply establish a nationwide problem and
extend a solution to public and private sectors alike; instead, it had to prove a
widespread pattern of violations of a particular constitutional right by state
governments in a particular context.5 7
D. Legislative Record: The More Flexible Hibbs/Lane Standard
In two subsequent cases, however, very different (and largely
liberal/moderate) majorities of the Court would uphold § 5 legislation -at least
in part-and indicate that the exacting Kimel/Garrett standard was not
universally applicable. 58 In these cases, the Court emphasized that the laws at
issue-or at least particular applications of them-served to protect
constitutional rights such as gender equality and access to the courts, which are
accorded heightened judicial protection. This heightened protection, the Court
49. Id. at 90.
50. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
51. Id. at 369.
52. Id. at 370.
53. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368-69.
54. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370.
55. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 371.
56. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81-82; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 371.
57. Justice Scalia has gone further, suggesting that Congress must prove a pattern of
discrimination with regard to each state. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 742-43
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). But see Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 537 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(attacking this view).
58. In Hibbs, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor formed a majority with Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, who had dissented in the prior cases. In Lane, Justice




said, made it "easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional
violations." 59 While not expressly disagreeing with the prior cases, these cases
rejected the evidentiary limitations the Court had previously applied,
apparently regarding them as irrelevant in the context of more strongly-
protected rights: the Court accepted evidence regarding private actors and local
governments, evidence of conduct that was not clearly unconstitutional and
that concerned discrimination in a variety of areas, and evidence not directly
before Congress. 60
Thus, in upholding the abrogation of immunity under the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in Hibbs, the Court relied primarily on a Bureau of
Labor Statistics survey showing gender disparities in private-sector leave;
testimony, based on a 50-state survey, that public-sector policies were similar;
and gender differences in states' parental leave laws.61 The Court also relied on
historical evidence of gender discrimination by states more generally, including
its own decisions.62 Similarly, in Lane, the Court held that the public services
provisions of the ADA "unquestionably [are] valid § 5 legislation" as they
apply to "the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the
courts."63 Lane (written by Justice Stevens) explicitly rejected "the mistaken
premise that a valid exercise of Congress' § 5 power must always be predicated
solely on evidence of constitutional violations by the States themselves" 64 -
seemingly contradicting Kimel and Garrett.65 Without distinguishing between
state and local actors, the Court observed that the "overwhelming majority" of
examples of disability discrimination collected by Congress related to public
programs and services. 66 The Court also pointed to state laws and judicial
decisions stretching back a century that had manifested discrimination against
disabled persons in access to courts and the administration of justice.67
Thus, Hibbs and Lane establish that in situations where § 5 legislation
protects constitutional rights afforded heightened protection, the standards
Congress must follow to establish a sufficient threat to those rights are relaxed.
Hibbs expressly distinguished Kimel and Garrett because they dealt with forms
of discrimination to which the Court applies only "rational basis" review. 68
While Boerne and Prepaid involved rights accorded heightened protection
(religious exercise and due process), they can also be distinguished from Hibbs
59. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736.
60. Id. at 731; Lane, 541 U.S. at 527 & n.16; Amar, supra note 31, at 351.
61. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730-32.
62. Id. at 729-30. Hibbs dealt only with FMLA's family care provision. The Courts of Appeals
addressing the issue to date have held that the FMLA's self-care provision does not validly abrogate
state immunity, on the ground that they are not targeted at gender discrimination See, e.g., Nelson
v. Univ. of Texas at Dallas, 535 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing cases).
63. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531, 533-34.
64. Id. at 527 n.16.
65. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368; Lane, 541 U.S. at 542 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
66. Lane, 541 U.S. at 526 (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at 371 n.7).
67. Id. at 525.
68. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735-36.
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and Lane because the legislative record in the earlier cases was virtually barren.
Some commentators have argued that a distinction based on the level of judicial
scrutiny afforded the relevant constitutional rights cannot fully explain the
different evidentiary standards applied by the Court.69 Nevertheless, most
scholars accept that this is clearest way to reconcile the cases. 70
E. Balancing Wrongs and Remedies
In addition to being based on sufficient evidence of a threat to
constitutional rights, remedies enacted under § 5 must be "congruent and
proportional" to the problems they address.71 Boerne states this as a balancing
test: "[s]trong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an
unwarranted response to another, lesser one." 72 Likewise, the Kimel Court
faulted the ADEA for "prohibit[ing] substantially more state employment
decisions and practices than would likely be held unconstitutional," 73 but also
acknowledged that "[d]ifficult and intractable problems often require powerful
remedies." 74 The Court relied on this latter statement in upholding relatively
broad remedies under the FMLA and Title II of the ADA.75 The analysis of the
remedy is thus intertwined with the evidentiary analysis: the stronger the
history of discrimination, the more robust a remedy may be. Kimel and Garrett
also suggest that broader remedies may be appropriate to protect constitutional
rights that call for heightened judicial review, such as freedom from race and
gender discrimination.76 Because proportionality is evaluated in relation to
69. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 31, at 353 ("[E]ach specific governmental action that is
unconstitutional because it is irrational should count just as much as a[n] action that is
unconstitutional because it fails to survive ... intermediate scrutiny."); Yoni Rosenzweig, Tennessee
v. Lane: Relaxing the Garrett Requirements for Civil Rights Legislation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301,
312 (2005) ("Given that the Lane Court accepts evidence of discrimination that would not [violate
the constitution under any standard], it should not matter that the standard for finding a ...
constitutional injury is lower in this case."). See also Araiza, supra note 32, at 56 ("Whether this...
distinction can provide a durable basis for these different approaches.., is an open question.").
70. See Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Extend and Amend the Voting
Rights, 44 Hous. L. REV. 1, 13 (2007); Michael E. Waterstone, Lane, Fundamental Rights, and Voting, 56
ALA. L. REV. 793, 807-08 (2005); Michael J. Pitts, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Once and Future
Remedy?, 81 DENY. U. L. REV. 225, 247 (2003). But see Araiza, supra note 32, at 54-55 (suggesting a
distinction between Lane and prior cases based on the regulation of "uniquely governmental"
functions). Some courts, without discussing this distinction, have appeared to apply a more liberal §
5 analysis even with regard to discrimination subject to rational-basis review. See, e.g., Toledo v.
Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 37-39 (1st Cir. 2006) (application of ADA to education).
71. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
72. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
73. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86.
74. Id. at 88.
75. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737; Lane, 541 U.S. at 524. In Lane, Justice Scalia rejected the congruence
and proportionality test outright as too "vague" and "flabby," contending that outside the context
of race discrimination § 5 should not be held to permit anything beyond remedies for actual
constitutional violations. Id. at 557-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is ironic that Scalia's position is
ostensibly based in large part on the risk of "interbranch conflict" caused by "check[ing] Congress's
homework," id. at 558, as it is hard to see how a drastic restriction of Congress's powers by the
Court would result in less interbranch conflict.
76. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86 (emphasizing rational-basis standard in finding remedies
overbroad); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372 (same). While Hibbs and Lane discuss the importance of
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both the strength of the record and the nature of the right, these factors "largely
determine the outcome,"77 making it questionable whether the congruent-and-
proportional test does much independent analytic work. Indeed, in every case
so far the Supreme Court has held that a statute either meets both tests or fails
both.78 The next Part considers which outcome is most likely for GINA.
II. ANALYSIS OF GINA EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS
GINA was first introduced in 1995 in response to concerns about the misuse
of information regarding individuals' possible genetic predispositions to
various diseases. Proponents of the bill sought to prevent insurers from using
such information to deny health care coverage and to prevent employers from
using genetic testing to weed out individuals with genetic predispositions to
potentially costly conditions. Congress determined that such decisions, based
on speculative fears about possible future conditions, were fundamentally
unwarranted and unfair and would lead to intrusions on workers' medical
privacy.79 Proponents were also concerned that even the possibility of genetic
discrimination would deter individuals from seeking genetic testing or
participating in genetic research, thereby blunting the societal benefits of this
emerging technology. Numerous versions of the bill and several hearings over
a dozen years culminated in GINA's final passage by votes of 414-16-1 in the
House and 95-0 in the Senate.80 GINA will go into effect in November of
2009.81
Under GINA, employers are generally prohibited from seeking genetic tests
or family health history, and are completely prohibited from basing
employment decisions on such information. 82 GINA provides employees the
same remedies as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, including damages against
public and private employers alike.83 Given the Supreme Court precedents
outlined above, states are likely to challenge GINA on two grounds. First,
Congress failed to expressly invoke the Fourteenth Amendment to justify
GINA's abrogation of immunity. Second, and perhaps most significantly, states
heightened scrutiny only with regard to the evidentiary analysis, they are certainly consistent with
this view.
77. Araiza, supra note 32, at 63.
78. See generally Kimel, 528 U.S. at 62; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 356; Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 721; Lane, 541
U.S. at 509. In Boerne, the Court said it would find the scope of RFRA improper "[rlegardless of the
state of the legislative record." 521 U.S. at 532. Even if this statement is taken literally, the dramatic
breath and stringent requirements of RFRA suggest that the proportionality prong should have
independent bite only in extreme cases.
79. H.R. REP. No. 110-028, pt. 1, at 28-29 (2007).
80. Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. - (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 7-12, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1342903) (summarizing history).
81. GINA § 213, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000ff note (2008).
82. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000ff-1. Title I of GINA adds these protections to several existing statutes to
provide protections in the area of insurance. See H.R. REP. No. 110-28, pt. 1, at 14; Roberts, supra
note 80, at 12-13.
83. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000ff-6 (2008).
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may claim that Congress did not assemble a sufficient record of genetic
discrimination, and specifically of discrimination or invasions of privacy by the
states. These challenges could weaken GINA's protections for the millions of
Americans employed by the states. GINA's potential vulnerability to these
challenges suggests that Congress has yet to adequately grapple with the § 5
jurisprudence of the last decade.
A. Failure to Invoke the Section 5 Power
While GINA does not include any express language regarding the
abrogation of state sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court held in Kimel that
Congress's intent to subject states to federal jurisdiction is sufficiently clear
where the statute clearly applies to the states.84 Congress clearly intended to
apply GINA to the states, because its employment provisions define both
"employee" and "employer" to encompass state employment.85 As discussed
above, however, Florida Prepaid raises questions about the Congress's
identification of the source of its authority for abrogation. The House report on
GINA cites the Commerce Clause as providing authority for the legislation.86
As already discussed, however, the Court has repeatedly rejected the
Commerce Clause and other Article I powers as bases for abrogating sovereign
immunity.87 That leaves § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a possible basis
for GINA's application to the states. The legislative history of GINA does not
expressly mention the Fourteenth Amendment mentioned as a basis for its
enactment. However, the reports do contain passing references indicating that
genetic discrimination may violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 88
Accordingly, the key question will be whether the Prepaid footnote
precludes reliance on § 5 to uphold GINA.89 If the footnote is read as
establishing a strict rule that reliance on one congressional power and failure to
mention another is determinative, there can be no abrogation under GINA. I
have suggested, however, that the footnote should be read narrowly since it
was implicitly distinguished in Kimel. As an antidiscrimination statute, GINA
84. Kimel, 528 U.S. at.
85. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000ff(2)(A)(ii) & 2000ff(2)(B)(ii) (2008).
86. H.R. REP. NO 110-028, pt. 1, at 49. The Report also identifies the Spending Clause as a basis
for GINA, id., apparently based on the statute's appropriation of funds to create a commission to
study whether a "disparate impact" provision should be added. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000ff-7(b) & (f)
(2008). While Congress can condition federal funding on a waiver of state immunity as a condition
for receipt of federal funds, discussed infra, Part III, GINA does not contain such a condition.
87. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59-66.
88. GINA § 2(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000ff note (2008) (noting that state sterilization laws have been
modified to comply with "essential constitutional requirements of due process and equal
protection"); S. REP. No. 110-48, at 9 (2007) (asserting that genetic testing implicates Fourteenth
Amendment) (quoting Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260, 1269
(9th Cir. 1998)). See also Nat'l Ass'n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia,
No. 3:07-CV-084, 2008 WL 1805439, at *6-7 (M.D.Ga. April 18, 2008) (suggesting a discussion of § 5
power in committee report may suffice to invoke that power for the Copyright Remedy Act, even
though report went on to focus on commerce power as basis for that Act).
89. See discussion supra Part I.
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has an obvious connection with equal protection. It also has an obvious
connection with the fundamental right to medical privacy. 90 Thus, while the
overbroad interpretations of some lower courts would jeopardize GINA's
abrogation of immunity, the better view is that failure to expressly invoke the
Fourteenth Amendment creates no problem here. GINA's sparse legislative
record, however, creates another, more serious hurdle.
B. Weakness of the Legislative Record
1. The Rights Protected by GINA
Before evaluating the evidence assembled by Congress, it is important to
identify the constitutional rights that GINA, through its application to state
employers, protects. As discussed above, the identification of constitutional
rights entitled to heightened judicial review was crucial to recent cases
upholding abrogation of sovereign immunity.
a. Genetic Discrimination
The most obvious right protected by GINA is the right, under the Equal
Protection Clause, to be free from discrimination on the basis of genetic
information. While there is no Equal Protection case law on discrimination
based on genetic information, there are substantial reasons for applying
heightened judicial protection to discrimination on the basis of genetic
information.91 Similar to suspect or quasi-suspect characteristics such as race,
national origin and gender, possession of a particular gene, such as one that
predisposes one to disease, is clearly an "immutable, or distinguishing
characteristic[]."92 Such genetic information by itself also "bears no relation to
ability to perform or contribute to society." 93 Possession of particular genetic
marker may indicate a possibility of future physical or mental impairment, but at
present it is a mere piece of probabilistic data, subject both to chance and, in
some cases, individual health and lifestyle choices.94 Like gender-based
90. See discussion infra.
91. See Jack M. Balkin, How New Genetic Technologies Will Transform Roe v. Wade, 56 EMORY L.J.
843, 860 (2007); Shannyn C. Riba, Note, The Use of Genetic Information in Health Insurance: Vho Will Be
Helped, Who Will Be Harmed and Possible Long-Term Effects, 16 S. CAL. REV. L. & Soc. JUST. 469, 484-86
(2007); Kristie E. Deyerle, Comment, Genetic Testing in the Workplace: Employer Dream, Employee
Nightmare- Legislative Regulation in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 18 COMP.
LAB. L.J. 547, 560-62 (1997); George P Smith, II & Thaddeus J. Bums, Genetic Determinism or Genetic
Discrimination, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23, 43-46 (1994). But see Roberts, supra note 80, at
52; Colin S. Diver & Jane Maslow Cohen, Genophobia: What Is Wrong with Genetic Discrimination?, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1475-81 (2001). Notably, in passing GINA Congress did not attempt to argue
that genetic predisposition resembles suspect or quasi-suspect classifications.
92. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986).
93. Deyerle, supra note 91, at 561 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687 (1973)).
94. See Gabrielle Kohlmeier, The Risky Business of Lifestyle Genetic Testing: Protecting Against
Harmful Disclosure of Genetic Information, 2007 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 5, 8-15 (2007) (discussing risks
posed by disclosure of information regarding genetic variations linked to diet and lifestyle); Lee M.
Silver, The Meaning of Genes and "Genetic Rights," 40 JURIMETRICS J. 9, 17-18 (1999) (discussing risk of
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distinctions, decisions based on genetic predisposition may sometimes be
legitimate, but are likely to more often be the result of unreasoned fears or
prejudices. 95 Because perceptions of genetic risks may be overblown, genetic
discrimination could readily "have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire
class of [individuals with a particular genetic marker] to inferior legal status
without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members." 96 If genetic
discrimination is subject to some form of heightened scrutiny, GINA's ban on
discrimination should be subject to the more liberal analytic framework
employed in Hibbs and Lane.
On the other hand, courts might analogize discrimination based on genetic
information to age and disability cases, which are subject only to rational basis
review. In refusing to treat mental retardation as a suspect classification, the
Supreme Court said that "where individuals in the group affected by a law
have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the
authority to implement,.. . the Equal Protection Clause requires only a rational
means to serve a legitimate end."97 Kimel and Garrett relied on this reasoning to
hold that age and disability discrimination are subject only to rational basis
review.98 While genetic markers do not affect current capabilities, they may
indicate a risk of future impairment. This risk itself is relevant to some
legitimate state interests, including the state's interest in minimizing the
potential costs (in the form of diminished performance, leaves of absence, and
health care) of future illness among state employees. Thus, much may depend
on courts' assessment of how often genes are likely to be relevant to state
actions, and how often they will be irrelevant. Because there is as yet no long
history of discrimination based on genes as such (nor could there be), courts
may refuse to apply heightened scrutiny. 99  If courts hold that genetic
discrimination is subject only to rational-basis review, the strict analysis of the
Kimel and Garrett decisions is likely to guide their treatment of GINA's
employment discrimination provision.
b. Privacy
GINA also protects other interests in addition to equal protection. Whereas
§ 202(a) of GINA prohibits the discriminatory use of genetic information, §
discrimination based on genetic predisposition to addiction despite individuals' ability to overcome
such tendencies).
95. Cf. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996) (noting that physical differences
based on gender must be recognized, but may not be used to reinforce social inferiority).
96. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687.
97. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441-42 (1985). See also id. at 440
(heightened scrutiny is appropriate for characteristics that are "so seldom relevant to the
achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed
to reflect prejudice and antipathy").
98. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366.
99. See Diver & Cohen, supra note 91, at 1476-77; cf. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 ("Today's skeptical
scrutiny of official action.., based on sex responds to volumes of history."). There is much more to




202(b) prohibits employers from requesting, requiring, or purchasing that
information, with few exceptions. Restricting the acquisition of genetic
information certainly furthers the goal of preventing discriminatory use, but it
also protects constitutional privacy rights, which call for more searching
judicial review of state conduct. In Norman-Bloodsaw, the Ninth Circuit held
that forced genetic testing of employees could violate both the Fourth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause. 100 Although this is the only reported
case precisely on point, there is a judicial consensus that the constitutional right
to privacy extends to medical testing as well as the privacy of medical
information generally, 10 1 including results of past tests, 10 2 and to government
acquisition of medical information from third parties. 10 3 Thus, the full scope of
GINA's privacy provision implicates the core constitutional right to privacy.
Because, unlike the discrimination provision, GINA's privacy provision clearly
implicates constitutional privacy rights that are subject to robust judicial
protection under current precedents, it must be analyzed under the more liberal
§ 5 standard of Hibbs and Lane rather than Kimel and Garrett. As the rest of this
section shows, this more liberal standard means that GINA's privacy provision
is more likely to survive constitutional challenge.
c. Race and gender
Congress noted in its findings that because "many genetic conditions and
disorders are associated with particular racial and ethnic groups and gender...
members of a particular group may be stigmatized or discriminated against as a
result of that genetic information." 104 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act already
places some limits on employer decisions regarding medical information; for
example, Norman-Bloodsaw held that Title VII prohibits screening black
employees for sickle-cell anemia trait.10 5 GINA supplements that protection by
providing a broad ban on such screening that is not subject to the Title VII
defense of business necessity.10 6 To some extent, then, both of GINA's
100. Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1269.
101. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) ("There can
be no question that an employee's medical records... are well within the ambit of materials entitled
to privacy protection"); Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 487 (10th Cir. 1994) (rejecting
qualified immunity for seizure of medical records).
102. See, e.g., Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Individuals who are
infected with the HIV virus clearly possess a constitutional right to privacy regarding their
condition").
103. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (recognizing that state's acquisition of all
prescriptions written for certain drugs implicates privacy right).
104. GINA § 2(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000ff note.
105. Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1272. It also prohibits the use of medical testing and medical
information if it has a disparate impact based on race or gender. See Melinda B. Kaufmann, Genetic
Discrimination in the Workplace: An Overview of Existing Protections, 30 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 393, 424
(1999). See also Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 796 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that Title VII
applies to a pizza company's policy prohibiting delivery drivers from wearing bears when
challenged by a black man with a disease that effects fifty percent of black men and prevents half of
those effected from shaving).
106. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (establishing business necessity
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employment provisions may be justified as a response to race and gender
discrimination, and benefit thereby from the more liberal framework of Hibbs
and Lane. 107 To date, the Supreme Court has always upheld § 5 legislation that
combats race or gender discrimination by the states. 10 8 While these important
rights are not implicated by most applications of GINA, the Court's recent
decisions have indicated a preference for piecemeal analysis of § 5 legislation,
according to the constitutional rights implicated. 10 9 Accordingly, an analysis
focused on race and gender discrimination should benefit GINA with respect to
the limited classes of cases that implicate those concerns.110
d. Policy goals
While protecting equality and privacy were major justifications for GINA's
employment provisions, equally important to Congress were concerns about
scientific research and public health.111 Most of the evidence offered to support
GINA relates not to actual discrimination, but to problems caused by public
fears of discrimination. The committee reports cite studies showing that many
Americans are concerned about losing jobs or insurance as a result of genetic
testing, and that these fears may lead them to avoid seeking genetic testing or
participating in genetic research. 112  This is a classic Commerce Clause
rationale.113 Since this kind of evidence does nothing to establish a threat of
violations of constitutional rights, there is no reason to expect courts to give it
any weight with regard to abrogating sovereign immunity.
2. Analysis under the Kimel/ Garrett standard
As discussed above, states asserting sovereign immunity will argue that
alleged constitutional violations based on genetic discrimination are subject
only to rational basis review and, accordingly, that courts should subject §
202(a) of GINA to the exacting evidentiary standard of Kimel and Garrett. If
analyzed under these precedents, GINA may be held invalid as applied to the
defense for Title VII disparate-impact claims).
107. GINA's employment provisions specifically excludes from coverage "information about the
sex or age of any individual." 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(C). By its terms, however, this exclusion does not
extend to genetic characteristics that are merely correlated with sex.
108. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 301; Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 445; Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 112; City of
Rome, 446 U.S. at 156; Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 721. See also Lane, 541 U.S. at 564 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (§ 5
laws targeting race discrimination need only comply with Necessary and Proper Clause).
109. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 509; Georgia, 546 U.S. at 151.
110. Similarly, under Georgia, GINA's abrogation of sovereign immunity will be valid in cases
presenting actual violations of constitutional rights, whether under the right to privacy or equal
protection. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151.
111. See Roberts, supra note 80, at 32-35.
112. H.R. REP. No. 110-28, pt. 1, at 28-29; S. REP. No. 110-48, at 6-7; Protecting Workers from
Genetic Discrimination: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 110th Cong. (2007)
(statement of Rep. Slaughter); id. (testimony of Karen Rothenberg)(citing studies).
113. Compare Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 243 (ADEA valid commerce legislation based on economic
effects), with Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-83 (ADEA invalid under § 5); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-27
(discussing the limits of Congress's § 5 enforcement power in the Title IX context).
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states.114 Under Kimel and Garrett, most of the evidence collected by Congress
would likely be deemed "beside the point" and disregarded because it concerns
discrimination in the private sector, and does not establish a pattern of
unconstitutional discrimination by the states themselves.115 The studies and
reports cited in the record either exclusively describe private-sector activity, or
fail to differentiate between public and private employment.116 The record
does include the case of Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, a state-operated facility
which was successfully sued for subjecting African-American employees to
mandatory medical testing over several years.117 Although this is clearly an
example of unconstitutional use of genetic information in state employment, it
is only a single case.
This leaves the two historical episodes of state discrimination noted by
Congress, neither of which concerned employment: laws permitting
sterilization of people with disabilities, and mandatory sickle-cell screening in
the 1970s.118 The sterilization laws were raised in Garrett, and the Court
dismissed them in a footnote, saying only that "there is no indication that any
State had persisted in requiring such harsh measures as of 1990 when the ADA
was adopted." 119 Accordingly, courts can be expected to give the evidence of
the sterilization laws little, if any, weight. Mandatory sickle-cell testing, too,
has long since been discontinued. If this historical evidence cannot be linked
with evidence of contemporary discrimination in the record, then GINA's
legislative record may be deemed too weak to support the abrogation of
sovereign immunity.120 In sum, GINA's record is comparable to the bodies of
114. See Roberts, supra note 80, at 52.
115. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90.
116. See S. REP. No. 100-48, at 7; Slaughter testimony (describing surveys of employers by the
American Management Association); see generally L. N. Geller, et al., Individual, Family and Societal
Dimensions of Genetic Discrimination: A Case Study Analysis, 2 SCIENCE & ENGINEERING ETHICS 71
(1996); see also S. REP. No. 110-48, at 7 (citing U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGICAL
ASSESSMENT, GENETIC MONITORING AND SCREENING IN THE WORKPLACE (1990),
http://www.princeton.edu/-ota/disk2/1990/9020/9020.PDF). Another study is described in
DOROTHY C. WERTZ & JOHN C. FLETCHER, GENETIC & ETHICS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 68-71 (2004). Of
the two academic studies cited by Congress, one gives no indication of the types of employers
reported to have engaged in discrimination, beyond stating that most were in "working-class
occupations." The Geller study is not a survey but a qualitative analysis of case studies. It does not
specify how many participants reported discrimination in employment as opposed to other areas,
let alone in public versus private employment.
117. The case settled after the Ninth Circuit held that nonconsensual medical testing implicated
the constitutional right to privacy, and that singling out Black employees for sickle-cell anemia
testing was also a form of race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (regardless of
whether test results were used against the employee). Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1269-72.The
court rejected claims under the ADA. Id. at 1273. This case was decided prior to Florida Prepaid,
Kimel and Garrett, and the defendants apparently did not assert sovereign immunity.
118. GINA §§ 2(2) &(3), 42 U.S.C.A. §2000ff note.
119. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369 n.6.
120. An additional gap in the record is Congress's failure to identify any specific shortcomings
in available state law remedies. While Congress expressly found that the "existing patchwork" of
state laws is "confusing and inadequate to protect [Americans] from discrimination," GINA § 2(5),
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000ff note, the record contains no evidence to support this contention with respect to
state employment laws. The only specific shortcomings of state law discussed in the record relate to
the insurance field, and particularly to federal preemption in that field. H.R. REP. NO. 110-28 pt. 1,
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evidence rejected by the Court in Kimel and Garrett: it consists primarily of
private sector and historical evidence, with only a handful of contemporary
examples of discrimination by states. 121 Under the Kimel/Garrett standard-
which states asserting sovereign immunity will argue is the applicable
standard-most of the evidence gathered by Congress is irrelevant, and what
little is left is clearly insufficient.
3. Analysis under Hibbs and Lane
A different picture is presented under the more liberal framework of Hibbs
and Lane, though the result is by no means assured. If courts apply the analysis
of Hibbs and Lane-as they should with respect to, at a minimum, GINA's
privacy provision that deal with the class of discrimination cases implicating
race and sex equality concerns-the evidence amassed by Congress should be
enough to support application to the states. The record included recent surveys
by the American Management Association that, like the Bureau of Labor
Statistics study relied on by the Court in Hibbs, showed the existence of a
significant current problem of invasions of genetic privacy in the private
sector. 122 Specifically, they show that a distinct minority of employers seek
genetic information about applicants and employees. While less than one in
twenty employers in these surveys engaged in testing for specific genetic
conditions, the survey also found that one in five employers sought family
medical history,123 which is prohibited under GINA to the extent that it
includes "the manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members of such
individual. " 124 Two academic studies conducted in the mid-1990s also provide
some evidence of this problem, despite some methodological shortcomings.
125
at 30; H.R. REP. No. 110-28 pt. 3, at 28 (2007). See also S. REP. No. 110-48, at 12. But the failure to
specifically address state employment laws, at least, should not be a major obstacle. While noting
the existence of state laws, Kimel and Garrett did not rely on them or specifically demand evidence
of their inadequacy.
121. In fact GINA is weaker, but in respects that appear to be irrelevant under the standards
applied in Kimel and Garrett. See discussion infra.
122. See S. REP. No. 11048, at 7; but see Patricia Nemeth & Terry W. Bonnette, Genetic
Discrimination in Employment, 88 MICH. B.J., January 2009, at 44 (characterizing record as showing "a
dearth of evidence that genetic information discrimination was a widespread problem").
123. Additionally, most employers who tested for genetic traits said they used that information
in personnel decisions, as did a substantial fraction who asked about family medical history. S. REP.
No. 100-48, at 7 (describing 2000 survey); Protecting Workers from Genetic Discrimination: Hearing
Before the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Rep. Slaughter)
(citing 2001 study).
124. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000ff(4)(A)(iii) (2008).
125. The Wertz/Fletcher study found that "almost all" examples of what patients at genetics
clinics described as discrimination in both employment and insurance involved symptomatic
conditions or were otherwise "characteristic of broad general employment practice ... or general
insurance practice . . . . None of the patients' reports pointed to specifically 'genetic'
discrimination," in the sense of being based solely on carrier status or predisposition. Although
data from medical professionals and the public did indicate that genetic discrimination in
employment "exists," the authors concluded that it was "rare." WERTZ & FLETCHER, supra note 116,
at 69-70. The Geller study is actually an analysis of case studies gathered from interviews; the
authors emphasized that it was "not a survey," had a low response rate, and that "any statistical
analysis of the cases would be inappropriate." The authors provided a breakdown of reports by
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Additionally, the record contains evidence, particularly in a 1989 report by the
Office of Technology Assessment, that genetic screening by employers has been
a continuing phenomenon since the 1970s, and has included some of the
nation's largest employers.126 The legislative record also included several
individual stories of discrimination, including two handled by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. 127
Although the GINA record contains only a few instances of recent state
violations,128 the Court's precedents nowhere demand a certain number of
recent constitutional violations by states. More importantly, they do not say
that recent actions are the only kind of evidence relevant to § 5 analysis. While
the cases since Boerne have focused heavily on recent evidence of constitutional
violations by states, the Court has never said that this is the only kind of
acceptable factual predicate for § 5 legislation.129 Each of the post-Boerne cases
involved new congressional responses to longstanding problems; nothing in
them mandates that Congress wait years for conclusive proof that past
violations are being perpetuated through innovative means. 130 Rather, the
Court, through its reliance on pre-Boerne decisions, "has recognized that
Congress has utilized a variety of approaches when establishing the historical
predicate for enacting prophylactic legislation."131 Notably, the Court's first
modern § 5 decision, upholding the language-discrimination section of the
Voting Rights Act, stated that Congress has the authority to assess "the risk or
pervasiveness of the discrimination" by state actors." 132
Consider the reauthorization of the preclearance provisions of the Voting
type of genetic condition, but did not specify how many reports related to employment. Geller et
al., supra note 116, at 83, 88. Finally, both studies relied on self-reports and provided little to no
detail about the cases, with one noting that it was "difficult to determine to what extent reports of
genetic discrimination are of actual rather than perceived discrimination." Id. at 83. If this collection
of "anecdotal" evidence constituted the only or the primary evidence supporting abrogation, these
shortcomings could be very problematic. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370; Lane, 541 U.S. at 542
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In light of the other, stronger evidence of private-sector use of genetic
information, however, these studies simply add a modicum of support to the record.
126. S. REP. No. 100-48, at 7 (citing U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT,
GENETIC MONITORING AND SCREENING IN THE WORKPLACE (1990), http://www.princeton.edu/-
ota/disk2/1990/9020/ 9020.PDF).
127. See Roberts, supra note 80 at 27-28. One case, settled by the EEOC, involved systematic
testing of employees. See S. REP. No. 110-48, at 9.
128. These include the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory case, as well as reports in the academic
studies of instances of discrimination based on family genetic history in education and state
adoption services. Geller, et al., supra note 116, at 77-78.
129. Mark A. Posner, Time Is Still On Its Side: Why Congressional Reauthorization of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act Represents a Congruent and Proportional Response to Our Nation's History of
Discrimination in Voting, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 51, 99 (2007).
130. Cf. Johnson v. Florida, 405 F.3d 1214, 1244 (11th Cir. 2005) (Wilson, J., dissenting in part)
(arguing Congress was not constrained to extend Voting Rights Act coverage only to particular
forms of discrimination it had documented, because "[i]f this were the standard, states would
always have one free bite at the apple").
131. Posner, supra note 129, at 99.
132. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966). Kimel even notes that review of legislative
history is itself only "[olne means" of evaluating § 5 remedies, suggesting that these cases' focus on
recent state violations is not exclusive. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88.
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Rights Act.133 The existence of the VRA preclearance provisions for four
decades has effectively prevented and deterred much discrimination, making it
more difficult to prove that its requirements are still needed.134 Congress's
rationale for periodic reauthorization therefore has begun with the long history
of unconstitutional discrimination, and "then appropriately [sought] to link
those violations to the present day through what Congress has concluded is a
continuing special risk of discriminatory decision making engendered by those
violations." 135 The Court embraced this approach in City of Rome v. United
States, in which the pre-Boerne Court upheld the 1975 VRA extension. 136 Rome
primarily relied not on evidence of recent constitutional violations but on the
evidence of frequent preclearance denials for voting changes that would have a
disparate impact on minorities, which cumulatively indicated the risk that
purposeful discrimination would recur without an extension.137 Thus, Rome
stands for a principle of "historical predicate flexibility," unchanged by
subsequent cases.138  Under this principle, at least when protecting
fundamental rights Congress may rely not only on a recent pattern of
constitutional violations, but alternatively on other evidence, both recent and
older, that establishes a special risk that historical violations are likely to be
perpetuated. 139
Like the VRA, GINA presents a "unique constitutional quandary," 140 and
as with the VRA, "it is the problem of time that lies at the heart of the
constitutional question." 141 The VRA's time problem arises from the fact that
the passage of time and the effectiveness of the law itself have both served to
lessen a historically severe problem. GINA presents the flip-side of this
problem: rapid technological developments have enabled previously
impossible forms of discrimination. A sensible extension of Rome's flexible
approach would be that, where the passage of time has resulted in the
emergence of qualitatively new or vastly expanded opportunities for invasion
133. The preclearance provisions, otherwise known as (the other) Section 5, provide for
mandatory federal review of all changes in election procedures in certain jurisdictions with a
history of pervasive voting discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).
134. See Karlan, supra note 70, at 20-27; Nathan Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting
Rights Act, 117 YALE. L.J. 174, 192-207 (2007).
135. Posner, supra note 129, at 100. Cf Ass'n for Disabled Americans v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 405 F.3d
954, 959 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding with regard to the ADA that "[i]n light of the long history of state
discrimination against students with disabilities, Congress reasonably concluded that there was a
substantial risk for future discrimination").
136. Rome, 446 U.S. at 180-82; Posner, supra note 129, at 101.
137. Rome, 446 U.S. at 180-82. Posner also describes how earlier decisions upholding aspects of
the VRA employed a similar "historical predicate flexibility." Posner, supra note 129, at 99-100.
138. See Posner, supra note 129, at 99-100. Earlier decisions upholding parts of the VRA
displayed a similar flexibility. See id.
139. Consistent with this approach, the district court considering the most recent challenge to
the VRA looked to both the past record and "the risk of future constitutional harm." Northwest
Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. 1 (NAMUDNO) v. Mukasey, 573 F.Supp.2d at 269, rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. NAMUDNO v. Holder, No. 08-322, slip op. (U.S. June 22, 2009),
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/08pdf/08-322.pdf.
140. Persily, supra note 134, at 192.
141. Posner, supra note 129, at 94.
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of constitutional rights; where the problem is proven to exist in the private
sector; and where states engaged in analogous violations in the past, the
threshold for recent evidence should be relatively modest. Under this view,
GINA's abrogation of immunity could and should be upheld.
It is only in recent years that scientists have discovered genetic links to a
wide variety of medical conditions, and that accurate and affordable testing for
a wide variety of traits has become available. 142 Opportunities for scrutiny of
workers' possible genetic predispositions were far fewer even a decade ago,
when most of the research in the record was conducted.14 3 Given the emergent
nature of the problem (and the relatively small fraction of American jobs
located in state governments), it might have been impossible for Congress to
uncover a large body of evidence regarding use of genetic information by state
employers. Yet the evidence Congress did assemble suggests that states are not
likely to be exempt from the practices of the private sector. Congress enacted
the National Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act of 1972 to halt states' use of
mandatory sickle-cell testing -precisely the sort of invasion of medical privacy
that GINA prohibits by state employers.144  Despite the 1972 Act, the
aforementioned Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory case revealed a years-long
pattern of coerced sickle cell testing.145 Recognizing the risk that these practices
would multiply rapidly in the coming years, GINA's sponsors argued that
Congress "[could] not possibly afford to wait any longer" 146 for this problem
"to flourish [and] take root." 147 Although not relied on by Congress, the history
of disability discrimination identified in Lane further establishes this risk,
142. Compare U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, THE ROLE OF GENETIC
TESTING IN THE PREVENTION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES 5 (1983),
http://www.princeton.edu/-ota/disk3/1983/8317/8317.PDF (describing genetic testing as "in its
infancy," with screening available for only a few traits, and not reliable for use in the general
population), with AMANDA K. SARATA, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, GENETIC TESTING:
SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND FOR POLICYMAKERS 4 (2007), http://sharp.sefora.org/wp-
content/uploads/2007/12/genetic-testing.pdf (describing rapid growth in genetic testing, with
over 1,000 tests available for clinical use).
143. See, e.g., Andrew E. Rice, Eddy Curry and the Case for Genetic Privacy in Professional Sports, 6
VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 5 (2006) (noting a more than six-fold increase in number of testable
disease-related traits since 1997).
144. See S. REP. No. 110-48, at 9 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300b). The sterilization laws, which persisted
for longer than mandatory sickle cell screening and involved an even more egregious invasion of
privacy, would also be relevant to this analysis. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 534 (Souter, J., concurring)
(citing these laws as supporting the ADA).
145. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1264-65.
146. 110 CONG. REC. H4095 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 2007) (statement of Rep. Slaughter).
147. Roberts, supra note 80, at 31-32 (quoting Sen. Snowe). The Court's rejection of what it called
"speculative harms" in Florida Prepaid is easily distinguished. There, the Court dismissed
Congress's concern that "patent infringement by States might increase in the future," calling it
merely "speculative." 527 U.S. at 641. This concern was based on the trend in state universities
toward commercializing the results of research. Id. at 656 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-960, pt. 1, at 38
(1990)). While Congress had evidence of a pattern of patent violations in the private sector, unlike
with GINA there was no historical evidence to suggest that states would be likely to engage in this
sort of behavior. Moreover, the supposed changed circumstances relied upon by Congress in Florida
Prepaid amounted to the fact that states' own choices gave them increased incentives to violate the
law. By contrast, GINA responds to changes in objective circumstances that provide new
opportunities and incentives for constitutional violations.
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because genetic discrimination is based essentially on the perception of an
individual's propensity to become disabled. 148
States will argue, however, that such a flexible approach to GINA is
inconsistent with the Court's recent precedents. While the post-Boerne cases
have not squarely held that a showing of widespread and recent state violations
is always required, their general approach, as well as some isolated language,
can be interpreted as adopting that approach.149 Accordingly, states will argue
that the flexible, risk-based analysis of earlier cases like Rome has been
abandoned, or limited to the context of race and/or statutory reauthorization.
Under this view, § 5, as the Supreme Court has construed it, simply does not
permit Congress to act with dispatch in the face of emerging threats to
constitutional rights.
In the event courts do hold that evidence of recent constitutional violations
is always required for § 5 legislation, the GINA record may not pass muster
even under Hibbs. As noted above, in Hibbs the key link between the
substantial evidence of private-sector discrimination and the abrogation of state
sovereign immunity was a 50-state survey showing that public sector policies
"differ[ed] little from those [of] private sector employers."' 5 0 The GINA record
contains no such evidence that current practices in private and public
employment are actually comparable. Instead there is a record similar to Kimel
and Garrett, with little evidence of a link between past or private actions and
contemporary state actors. Even assuming those cases would have turned out
differently under the Hibbs/ Lane standard, GINA is weaker: the record in Kimel
included relatively recent evidence of age discrimination in California, 151 while
Garrett record contained substantial evidence of disability discrimination in
non-employment contexts.152 Accordingly, while strong arguments exist for
upholding abrogation under GINA's privacy provisions, that outcome is by no
means certain.
148. See, e.g., Steve Lash, Maryland employers work to comply with Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act, DAILY RECORD (Baltimore), Mar. 2, 2009,
http://www.mddailyrecord.com/article.cfm?id=10858&type=UTTM (subscription required)
(quoting EEOC chair Stuart Ishimaru describing GINA as extending protection to individuals with
a propensity to become disabled).
149. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530 ("RFRA's legislative record lacks examples of modem instances...
.") (emphasis added); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369 n.6 ("[T]here is no indication that any State had
persisted in requiring such harsh measures as of 1990 when the ADA was adopted.") (emphasis
added). This view is most clearly stated, however, in the Hibbs and Lane dissents, which criticize the
Court's reliance on "outdated" evidence. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 744 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Lane, 541
U.S. at 540 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
150. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730 n.3; Lane, 542 U.S. at 529 n.17 (citing the 50-state survey in Hibbs as
a key piece of evidence justifying Congressional action).
151. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90.
152. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369-72. A skeptical court could also invoke the (unsubstantiated)
assertion of the Congressional Budget Office, in its cost estimate for GINA, that states are unlikely
to engage in prohibited conduct. CBO Statement on H.R. 493, in H.R. REP. No. 110-28 Part 1, at 49.
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C. GINA's narrow remedies may not compensate for a weak record
It is worth reiterating that congruence and proportionality is best
understood as a balancing test. GINA provides a well-tailored remedy, placing
limited burdens on states that largely track constitutional principles. Its privacy
provision is "narrowly targeted" 153 at the unnecessary, covert, or coercive
collection of information, and contains no less than six exceptions, ensuring that
states are not punished for inadvertent or innocuous collection of
information. 5' 4 It is thus considerably less burdensome than the affirmative
duties upheld in Hibbs and Lane. GINA's discrimination provision is also more
narrowly tailored than the ADA's. 155 To the extent that they prevail under the
evidentiary analysis of Hibbs and Lane, both provisions should be deemed
sufficiently tailored as well. Yet just as the case law indicates that a stronger the
record of discrimination will justify a more robust remedy, a weak record will
not support even a modest remedy.156 Thus, to the extent that the record
supporting GINA is deemed insufficient to support § 5 legislation, GINA's
modest scope may not suffice to save it.
III. WHAT WENT WRONG WITH GINA?
Based on the above analysis, GINA's employment provisions may be
vulnerable to attack under the Supreme Court's Section 5 jurisprudence insofar
as they provide remedies for state employees. First, unless courts apply
heightened constitutional scrutiny to genetic discrimination, states may be
successful in arguing that the scant evidence collected is insufficient to permit
suits for damages against states under GINA's employment provision in most
cases. Second, there is a strong case for abrogating sovereign immunity in
those cases where employers rely on genetic information linked to particular
racial or ethnic - but this will only be a limited slice of GINA cases. Third, the
case for upholding GINA's privacy provision as § 5 legislation is also stronger
and should prevail, but this outcome is far from certain. Thus, while in general
GINA represents a story of bipartisan legislative success -providing a nuanced
solution to a complex emerging problem -in the context of state employment it
risks falling short, just as have previous civil rights laws. But it didn't have to
be this way. Legislation contemporaneous with GINA demonstrates how
153. Cf. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738.
154. Collection of genetic information is permitted if it is inadvertent; is used anonymously and
with permission for purposes of a health benefit program; consists of family medical history needed
to comply with the FMLA; appears in publicly or commercially available documents; is
appropriately used to monitor the potential effects of toxic substances; or if the employee works in
DNA testing and a sample is needed to detect contamination. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000ff-1(b)(1)-(6). See
also S. REP. No. 110-48, at 29 (stressing that Congress carefully drafted exceptions in response to
business input to avoid unintended burdens or conflicts with other laws).
155. Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000ff-1(a) (2008) (employers may not "discriminate ... because of
genetic information" or "limit, segregate or classify" on such basis) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-7 (no
disparate-impact claims) with Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372-73 (emphasizing reasonable-accommodation
and disparate-impact provisions).
156. See generally Kimel, 528 U.S. at 62.
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Congress how can more effectively respond to the Court's § 5 jurisprudence
through a combination of diligent fact-finding and careful drafting.
A. Building a Supporting Record: The Voting Rights Act Reauthorization Act
The Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights
Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 (VRA 2006
Reauthorization) 157 was passed 22 months before GINA by similarly
overwhelming margins.158 The Act reauthorized for an additional 25 years
several temporary provisions set to expire in 2007, most importantly the
"preclearance" provisions, which require certain jurisdictions with a history of
racial discrimination in voting to obtain prior approval from the Attorney
General or a federal court for any changes in voting procedures. 159 The
Supreme Court upheld the preclearance provisions when they were initially
passed in 1966,160 and upheld them again following the 1975 reauthorization.161
This, of course, was prior to the Rehnquist Court's string of § 5 rulings.
Seeking to ensure that the reauthorization would survive judicial review,
Congress developed one of the most extensive legislative records in its
history.162 The House and Senate Judiciary Committees held no less than 21
hearings on the VRA 2006 Reauthorization, assembling over 15,000 pages of
testimony and documentary evidence from nearly one hundred witnesses as
well as other interested groups and government agencies. In addition, the
committees reviewed over a dozen outside reports on the effectiveness of, and
continuing need for the preclearance provisions in covered jurisdictions around
the country. This record included statistics regarding state registration and
turnout; low numbers of minority elected officials in covered jurisdictions,
numbers of Attorney General objections and "more information" requests filed
regarding proposed voting changes; numbers of judicial preclearance and
enforcement suits brought under the Act; constitutional suits over voting
discrimination; the employment of federal election observers; patterns of
racially-polarized voting; and evidence that Section 5 deterred state and local
157. Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006).
158. Raymond Hernandez, After Challenges, House Approves Renewal of Voting Act, N.Y. TIMES,
July 14, 2006, at A13 (noting that the VRA 2006 Reauthorization passed the House by a vote of 390
to 33); Carl Hulse, By a Vote of 98-0, Senate Approves 25 Year Extension of Voting Rights Act, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2006, at A16.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006). The Act also extends the VRA's language access provisions, which
require certain jurisdictions to provide language assistance to voters with limited English
proficiency. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a (2006). Although originally enacted in 1975, the constitutionality
of the language access requirements has never yet been challenged. See James Thomas Tucker, The
Battle Over "Bilingual Ballots" Shifts to the Courts: A Post-Boerne Assessment of Section 203 of the Voting
Rights Act, 45 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 507, 579-80 (2008) (arguing provisions are constitutional); Daniel P.
Tokaji, Intent and Its Alternatives: Defending the New Voting Rights Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 349, 373 (2006)
(same). But see Tucker, supra note 159, at 514 (quoting testimony by opponent that provisions would
probably be challenged if reauthorized).
160. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308.
161. Rome, 446 U.S. at 172-83.
162. H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 5 (2006); S. REP. No. 109-295, at 10 (2006).
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officials from adopting voting changes.
From this evidence, Congress concluded that while "[s]ignificant progress
has been made in eliminating first generation barriers experienced by minority
voters," "vestiges of discrimination in voting continue to exist." 163 Congress
focused especially on the proliferation of litigation and federal government
objections and oversight actions in relation to state and local voting practices,
which Congress believed demonstrated that the Act continued to prevent
discrimination that would otherwise have occurred. 164 Congress also pointed
to continuing patterns of racially polarized voting, which provide a continuing
political incentive for race-based manipulation of the polls.165 Additionally, the
House Report provided an extended discussion of Congress's powers under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and explained how the Act satisfied
Supreme Court precedents. 166  The reauthorization of the preclearance
provisions was immediately challenged, and was upheld by a three-judge panel
of the D.C. federal district court, which found that the VRA 2006
Reauthorization's record was "far more powerful" than those found
satisfactory in Hibbs and Lane.167
At oral argument, several justices appeared skeptical of the scope and
supporting record of the reauthorization. 168 In particular, they noted that while
Congress compiled an extensive record, it failed to reexamine the geographic
coverage of the preclearance provisions in light of the passage of time.169 The
Court, however, ultimately decided the case on statutory grounds, leaving the
constitutional question for another day, with only Justice Thomas openly
urging the Act's invalidation.1 70 Should the Court have occasion to revisit the
issue, it is impossible to predict how it would be decided- or what shifts in § 5
doctrine might result.171  Nevertheless, the VRA 2006 Reauthorization
163. VRA 2006 Reauthorization § 2(b)(1) & (2), Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577, 577.
164. Id. at § 2(b)(4)-(5) & (8), 120 Stat. 577-78.
165. Id.
166. H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 54-60 (2006). But see Persily, supra note 134, at 182-92 (describing
the controversial, post-enactment Senate Report, joined only by Republicans and raising
reservations about the bill).
167. NAMUDNO, 573 F.Supp.2d at 271. Because the suit asserted both a constitutional challenge
and the plaintiff jurisdiction's claim for "bailout" from the preclearance requirements, it was subject
to the VRA's provision for review by a three-judge district court panel, with direct review by the
Supreme Court. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-2 (2006).
168. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v.
Holder, No. 08-322, slip op. (U.S. June 22, 2009), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/
08pdf/08-322.pdf.
169. Id. While the fact-finding behind the VRA 2006 Reauthorization was massive, lawmakers
declined to reexamine the structure of the preclearance provisions themselves, judging that opening
this settled "can of worms" would have caused "the political coalition behind the law [to]
collapse[.]" Persily, supra note 134, at 207-16. Some commentators cautioned that, although
Congress's fact-finding process was aimed at surviving judicial review, the failure to revisit the
substance of the law, including its coverage and bailout formulas, may have jeopardized it. See
generally Richard H. Pildes, Political Avoidance, Constitutional Theory and the VRA, 117 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 148 (2007), http://yalelawjournal.org/2007/12/10/pildes.htm.
170. NAMUDNO v. Holder, No. 08-322, slip op. (U.S. June 22, 2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
171. See, e.g., Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Legislative Findings, Congressional Powers, and the Future of the
[Vol. 35:2
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008
represents the kind of robust effort Congress can make to justify its exercise of
this remedial authority to protect civil rights according to the Court's
announced criteria. Of course, Congress will likely not be able to develop such
a truly massive record each time it exercises its § 5 authority, and may not
always place such a high priority on doing so. Nor will such an overwhelming
effort necessarily be required for other laws, given the unique burdens imposed
on states by the VRA.1 7 2 But the VRA 2006 Reauthorization shows that
Congress can, when sufficiently motivated, recognize the challenges posed by
the Court's § 5 precedents and make a concerted effort to overcome them.
B. Findings, Rights and Remedies: The End Racial Profiling Act
Another example of building support for congressional authority into
legislation is the proposed End Racial Profiling Act of 2007 (ERPA),173 first
introduced by Representative John Conyers and Senator Russ Feingold in 2001
in response to concerns that law enforcement agencies were unfairly targeting
minorities for routine both routine and spontaneous stops and searches. The
Act would prohibit federal, state and local law enforcement agencies from
racially profiling, 174 which is defined as "relying, to any degree, on race,
ethnicity national origin, or religion" in investigation or enforcement decisions,
except when using a description of a specific criminal suspect. 175 ERPA
contains numerous findings that support its constitutionality under § 5,
including: a finding that "[sitatistical evidence from across the country
demonstrates that racial profiling is a real and measurable phenomenon";
specific findings to that effect from national surveys; that racial profiling
increased in the wake of September 11, 2001; and that such profiling violates the
Equal Protection Clause. 176 Particularly notable in light of Lane, the legislation
invokes not only equal protection but also the rights to travel and to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures as bases for the legislation, along with
the Commerce Clause (on the basis that racial profiling discourages interstate
travel). 177  While ERPA has never been reported out of committee, these
statutory findings and purposes would likely be sufficient to support the Act's
limited ban on consideration of race, and its provision for citizen suits for
Voting Rights Act, 82 IND. L.J. 99, 130 (2007) (concluding that "the question for the future is
ultimately a question of judicial attitudes and whether the Court can muster the will to strike down
the most effective civil rights statute in history"). Numerous commentators have argued that the
preclearance provisions should be upheld. See, e.g., Kristen Clarke, The Congressional Record
Underlying the 2006 Voting Rights Act, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385 (2008); Karlan, supra note 70;
Posner, supra note 129; Tokaji, supra note 159.
172. See, e.g., Berry v. Doles, 438 U.S. 190, 200 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) ("It
must be remembered that the Voting Rights Act imposes restrictions unique in the history of our
country on a limited number of selected States.").
173. H.R. 4611, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 2481, 110th Cong. (2007).
174. ERPA § 101, H.R. 4611.
175. Id. at § 3(6).
176. Id. at § 2(a).
177. Id. at § 2(b).
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injunctive relief and attorneys' fees.178
C. The Waiver Approach: The Employment Non-Discrimination Act
As previously discussed, it might have been impossible, even with the best
efforts, for Congress to document a widespread pattern of present genetic
discrimination. Fortunately, this is not the only way Congress can effectively
respond to the Court's § 5 precedents. Indeed, Congress likely could have
ensured GINA's full application to state employers by requiring that states
waive their immunity in exchange for maintaining federal grants. The Supreme
Court made clear two decades ago, in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in South
Dakota v. Dole,179 that imposing conditions on federal funding for the states is
generally permissible. 180 Responding to a Supreme Court decision that limited
remedies under the Rehabilitation Act,181 Congress passed a law in 1986 that
explicitly required, as a condition of receipt of any federal funds, a waiver of
states' sovereign immunity for suits under that Act as well as under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act, and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.182
Every court of appeals has accepted the validity of such waivers. 183 While
some commentators warned during the Rehnquist years that aggressive use of
the spending power might be seen by the Court as impermissible
"circumvention" of its federalism rulings,184 the Roberts Court has given no
indication that it will invalidate such legislation wholesale .185
The current Court has, however, said that it will interpret all such
178. Id. at § 102. In addition to the mandatory prohibition on racial profiling, ERPA would make
the implementation of certain policies to prevent such profiling a condition for receipt of certain
federal grants. These conditions are not subject to private judicial enforcement, but instead to an
administrative complaint process. Id. at §§ 301-303.
179. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
180. Id. at 212 (upholding condition on federal highway funds that states enact minimum
drinking age of twenty one).
181. See generally Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
182. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986 § 1003,42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (2006).
183. Nieves-Mdrquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 127-29 (1st Cir. 2003); Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302
F.3d at 167-76 (3d Cir. 2003); Constantine v. Rectors and Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474,
491-96 (4th Cir. 2005); Miller v. Texas Tech Univ. Health Sciences Ctr., 421 F.3d 342, 349 (5th Cir. 2005)
(en banc); Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, 269 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2001); Stanley v. Litscher, 213 F.3d
340, 344 (7th Cir. 2000); Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1081-82 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Lovell
v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1050-52 (9th Cir. 2002); Brockman v. Wyo. Dept. of Fam. Servs., 342 F.3d
1159, 1167-68 (10th Cir. 2003); Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trustees, 344 F.3d 1288,
1293 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Barbour v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 374 F.3d 1161 (D.C. Cir.
2004). But see Garcia v. SUNY Health Sciences Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 113-15 (2d Cir. 2001)
(holding waiver does not extend to disputes arising prior to time when abrogation of immunity
under ADA was in question). See also Rochelle Bobroff & Harper Jean Tobin, Strings Attached: The
Power of the Federal Purse Waives State Sovereign Immunity for the Rehabilitation Act, CLEARINGHOUSE
REV., May-June 2008, at 1-2, 16 (summarizing these cases).
184. See e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should
Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J.
459, 504-41 (2003).
185. See Neil S. Siegel, Dole's Future: A Strategic Analysis, 16 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 165, 201 (2008);
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 Duke L. J. 345, 355-84 (2008).
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legislation narrowly. In Arlington Central School District v. Murphy,186 Justice
Alito wrote for the Court that any law based on Congress's spending power
will be valid only to the extent that it provides "clear notice" to state officials of
the full extent of every duty and potential liability it creates.187 Arlington could
result in a contraction of individual rights and remedies under a variety of
federal laws.188 For example, following Boerne, Congress expressly required
that states waive their immunity in religious-expression cases a condition of
federal funding.189 While courts have upheld this waiver, several have ruled
that it does not extend to damages-even though this was clearly Congress's
intention.190
While reliance on the spending power may present something of a trade-off
because of Arlington, satisfying the Court's standards for textual clarity with
confidence will generally be easier than satisfying its standards of evidence. A
bill contemporaneous with GINA illustrates how Congress can use the
spending power to effectively respond to Kimel and Garrett, while also avoiding
the potential pitfalls of Arlington. The Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(ENDA) of 2009,191 introduced on June 24, 2009 by Representative Barney
Frank, includes explicit spending-based waiver language. 192 The bill, which
would prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, has been
introduced in Congress beginning in 1994.193 Waiver language was first
inserted into the bill in 2001, shortly after the Garrett decision.194 The 2002
186. 548 U.S. 291 (2006).
187. Id. at 296. Prior to Arlington, a clear notice standard had applied only to a limited set of
questions about "unforeseeable" forms of liability, rather than to every question of remedies or
interpretation. See id. at 304-05 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 316-18 (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 188 n.2 (2002); id. at 191 (Souter, J., concurring); Bennett v.
Kentucky Dep't of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1985).
188. See Arlington, 548 U.S. at 318 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]o view each statutory detail of a
highly complex federal/state program ... simply through the lens of linguistic clarity, rather than
to assess its meanings in terms of basic legislative purpose, is to risk a set of judicial interpretations
that can prevent the program, overall, from achieving its basic objectives or that might well reduce
a program in its details to incoherence."). See also Bagenstos, supra note 185, at 350 (arguing that the
Roberts Court is likely to apply Arlington to "skew the interpretation and limit the enforceability of
conditional spending statutes").
189. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a) (2006).
190. Compare Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1269-71 (11th Cir. 2007), with Madison v. Virginia,
474 F.3d 118, 131-33 (4th Cir. 2006); Sossamon v. Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 330-31 (5th Cir. 2009);
Williams v. Beltran, 569 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1059 (C.D.Cal. 2008); El Badrawi v. Dept. of Homeland
Sec., 579 F.Supp.2d 249, 259 (D.Conn. 2008); Pugh v. Goord, 571 F.Supp.2d 477, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
This distinction is especially dubious because under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, Congress could
have allowed for injunctive relief against states even without a waiver. By far the most likely
explanation for the provision's inclusion, and one states could easily comprehend, is that Congress
intended to expand the relief that would otherwise be available. Cf. Webman v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 441 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (applying suit/liability distinction to federal immunity,
where Young does not apply).
191. ENDA of 2009, H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (2009).
192. ENDA of 2009 § 11, H.R. 3017.
193. The version of the bill introduced in the 111th Congress also prohibits discrimination on the
basis of gender identity, a provision that civil rights groups insist must be included. ENDA of 2009
§ 4(a), H.R. 3017. See also Lou Chibbaro, Jr., Hate crimes, ENDA seen as top legislative priorities, WASH.
BLADE, Dec. 5, 2008, http://www.washblade.com/2008/12-5/news/national/13707.cfm.
194. Compare ENDA of 1999 § 13, H.R. 2355, 106th Cong. (1999), with ENDA of 2001 § 13, H.R.
20091
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Senate and 2007 House reports on ENDA provide a stark contrast to the reports
on GINA. These reports specifically invoke both the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Spending Clause; discuss in detail the Supreme Court's decisions on
both abrogation and waiver of state sovereign immunity; and outline in detail
why the bill complies with both lines of decisions. 195 The bill also avoids
Arlington problems by linking its remedies provisions to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act and by expressly providing for attorney and expert fees. 196
D. Explanations for GINA's Shortcomings
As enacted, GINA provides less than robust support for abrogation of state
sovereign immunity based on the § 5 power, and no alternative provision for
waiver of that immunity. GINA's to address the standards set by the Supreme
Court is particularly striking given that GINA is the first new employment
discrimination law passed since Kimel was decided in 2000. Why did Congress
fail to clearly invoke its Fourteenth Amendment power, produce a more
extensive record and a more compelling explanation of the need to apply GINA
to the states, or include a provision requiring waiver of state immunity?
Moreover, why did Congress fail to take these steps with GINA when it did
take them with other, contemporaneous legislation? Although it may have
been difficult - perhaps even impossible - to develop a much stronger record in
light of the emergent nature of the problem of genetic discrimination, Congress
could still have relied on a funding-based waiver of immunity, as it did in
ENDA. 197
The most likely explanation is that, amidst the many considerations that
went into crafting this complex bill and building bipartisan support for it,
justifying GINA's application to the states was simply neglected. The contrast
2692, 107th Cong. (2001).
195. S. REP. No. 107-1284, at 19-25 (2002); H.R. REP. No. 110-406, at 27-30 (2007). As support for
abrogation, the reports pointed to "half a century's worth of severe anti-gay bias in both the state
and private employment contexts." They noted that such discrimination was in the past "a matter
of policy . .. in many police forces, fire departments, schools, and public agencies of our country."
And they cited numerous legal and historical sources detailing the history of anti-gay
discrimination, including the history of constitutional litigation. H.R. REP. NO. 110-406, at 11-15.
The 2007 report cited numerous studies and reports on the continued prevalence of sexual
orientation discrimination. Id. at 15-16. It also described numerous individual cases, including ten
litigated cases of discrimination by state and local agencies. Id. at 13-17.
196. ENDA §§ 10 & 12, H.R. 3685. Ironically, the Eleventh Amendment was cited as one reason
President Bush might veto ENDA -despite the inclusion of a spending-based waiver clause of the
type courts have upheld. Office of Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy:
H.R. 3685 - The Employment Non-Discrimination Act (Oct. 23, 2007),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/110-1/hr3685sap-rpdf. By contrast, the
Eleventh Amendment was never raised in objection to GINA. See, e.g., Office of Management and
Budget, Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 1424 - Paul Wellstone Mental Health and Equity
Act of 2007 (Mar. 5, 2008), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/110- 2 /saphrl 4 2 4 -
h.pdf.
197. Other potential explanations are also unsatisfactory. If Congress had been simply lulled into
complacency by the decisions in Hibbs, Lane and Georgia, it likely would not have gone to the
trouble it did with the VRA. And if Congress had willfully rejected the Court's rulings, it would
presumably have said so, as it did when it passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003
(PBABA). See PBABA § 2, Pub. L. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201, 1201-06 (2003).
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with the VRARA and ENDA is likely explained by the higher profile and more
controversial nature of those bills, and by the fact that Congress is not a unitary
actor. Unlike GINA, ENDA and the VRA preclearance provisions faced
longstanding ideological opposition, and a judicial challenge was nearly a
foregone conclusion. 198 Additionally, some members of Congress (along with,
of course, their staff and the advocacy groups that help draft legislation) are
presumably more sensitive than others to the possibility of federalism-based
constitutional challenges. For these reasons, lawmakers and advocates crafting
the VRARA, ERPA and ENDA responded to Kimel and Garrett with new
language and findings, while those working on GINA did not.
IV. THE SOLUTION: RENEWED CONGRESSIONAL ENGAGEMENT WITH THE COURT
The explanation for GINA's vulnerabilities may well be some combination
of insufficient attention by lawmakers and real hurdles presented by the
Court's jurisprudence. This suggests a twofold problem for Congress in
passing effective legislation that protects individual rights and applies to public
and private entities alike. On the one hand, lawmakers should give greater and
more consistent attention to the Court's federalism jurisprudence in the
development of legislative language and history. The foregoing analysis
suggests some guidelines Congress should follow.
A. Congressional Intent
Lawmakers should state explicitly, preferably in the statutory text itself, the
legislation's basis in Congress's commerce, spending, and/or Fourteenth
Amendment powers. They should also indicate, through a statutory statement
of purpose, the range of constitutional rights Congress is seeking to protect
when invoking the § 5 power. Because some laws, such as the ADA, potentially
protect a wide range of constitutional rights, this statement should use
language that is exemplary rather than exhaustive. Finally, Congress should
state explicitly that it intends to abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to the §
5 power.
B. Careful Fact-Finding
Congress should make a concerted attempt to develop a factual record that
will satisfy the Court's precedents. This means not only establishing the
general need for legislation, but also amassing substantial evidence that speaks
to the standards of relevance the Court has articulated with regard to state
198. See generally James Thomas Tucker, The Politics of Persuasion: Passage of the Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization Act of 2006, 33 J. LEGIS. 205 (2007); Sharon M. McGowan, The Fate of ENDA in the
Wake of Maine: A Wake-Up Call to Moderate Republicans, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 623 (1998) . Indeed, the
challenge to the preclearance provisions was filed just weeks after the VRA 2006 Reauthorization
was enacted. Tucker, supra note 200, at 267 (citing Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v.
Mukasey, 573 F.Supp.2d 221, 223 (D.D.C. 2008)).
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action and constitutional violations. This record - developed through
hearings, solicitation of reports from relevant organizations, and reports of
congressionally delegated agencies - should be discussed in detail in
committee reports, and reflect in specific statutory findings.
C. Analysis of Precedent
Although the Court has never specifically faulted lawmakers for failing to
discuss its prior decisions, Congress can likely strengthen its case by explaining
how the record it has developed, and the remedies it has provided, comport
with the case law. When applying damages remedies to the states, this means
explaining in detail why Congress found a serious threat of constitutional
infringements by states. It also means justifying the precise scope of statutory
remedies in terms of that threat. In contrast to the scant discussion in the
reports on GINA, the discussions of congressional authority in the VRARA and
ENDA reports read like an opening brief, setting out a roadmap for courts to
uphold the legislation.
D. Express Waiver of Immunity
A provision requiring waiver of immunity in exchange for federal funding
can provide a "belt-and-suspenders" approach, avoiding uncertainties
concerning the sufficiency of the legislative record. While reliance on the
spending power can raise "clear notice" problems under Arlington, the risk of
relying on § 5 alone may be greater, for example, where legislation addresses a
relatively new problem, where much of the evidence identified by Congress
may not meet the Court's standards of relevance, or where the strength of the
supporting record is otherwise in doubt. Waiver provisions should refer
specifically to waiver of immunity and/or to liability based on receipt of federal
financial assistance.
E. Enumeration of Remedies
Because of the Court's parsimonious approach to spending-based statutes
in Arlington, reliance on this power makes it especially important to spell out
statutory remedies with particularity, including not only a right to sue but a
specific enumeration of remedies. One approach, used in both GINA and
ENDA, is to link the new statute to the remedies provisions of an existing law
such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 199 Alternatively, Congress may simply
enumerate the range of available remedies, e.g., equitable and legal relief,
including back pay, damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees (including expert
fees). These guidelines should form a "federalism checklist" for all legislation
(such as civil rights laws and other measures protecting individual rights) that
199. GINA § 207,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000ff-6; ENDA § 10(b), H.R. 3685.
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could be subject to federalism-based challenges. 200
At the same time, even Congress consistently "doing its homework" cannot
completely guarantee that remedial legislation will not be invalidated or
eroded. The shifting, fact-bound, and splintered nature of the Court's decisions
in this area means that § 5 legislation will always face some risk of invalidation.
And while funding-based waivers provide an alternative to this risk in the state
immunity context, after Arlington they may also present some (though probably
less) risk of restrictive interpretation of rights and remedies. Therefore,
lawmakers should strive to defend Congressional authority against further
abridgment by the courts.20 1
To this end, Congress should consider nominees' views of congressional
power in confirmation votes for all federal judges, as well as relevant executive
officials.20 2 Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee took steps in this
direction by raising the Court's Commerce Clause and § 5 decisions during the
confirmations of Chief Justice Roberts and, to a lesser extent, Justice Alito.20 3
Lawmakers should also be more active in speaking directly to the Supreme
Court through amicus briefs when congressional authority is at issue, providing
a potentially powerful supplement to the voice of the Solicitor General -as did
fifty-one current and former members of Congress in Hibbs.204  Finally,
Congress can appeal to the Court's dependence on its perceived legitimacy
through the use of oversight hearings, resolutions, and other public statements
to spotlight disfavored decisions. The Senate Judiciary Committee held such a
hearing in 2002 in response to the initial run of § 5 cases.20 5 These congressional
efforts to date have been laudable but sporadic, and should be strengthened.
200. Cf. Deborah Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of
Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 562-63 (2009) (suggesting steps Congress
should take to ensure the full effectiveness of overrides of the Court's statutory decisions).
201. Some have called for stronger responses to constitutional decisions of which lawmakers
disapprove, including limiting courts' jurisdiction or appropriations, or impeaching judges based
on their decisions. See generally Mark C. Miller, When Congress Attacks the Federal Courts, 56 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1015 (2003). In addition to the obvious fact that jurisdiction-stripping would be self-
defeating in the context of preserving federal remedies, these responses are objectionable because
they would directly interfere with the work of the federal courts and threaten judicial
independence.
202. See Charles E. Schumer, Under Attack: Congressional Power in the Twenty-First Century, I
HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 3, 37-39 (2007); Hillary Rodham Clinton & Goodwin Liu, Separation Anxiety:
Congress, the Courts, and the Constitution, 91 GEO. L.J. 439,450 (2003).
203. See Lazarus, supra note #, at 9-14, 28-29.
204. Brief of Amici Curiae Senators Christopher Dodd & Edward M. Kennedy et al. in Support
of Respondents, Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 721 (No. 01-1368).
205. See Narrowing the Nation's Power: The Supreme Court Sides with the States: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 97-99 (2002) (Statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary). In 2008, the committee held three hearings focused on statutory and
preemption decisions that, in the committee leaders' view, undermined the rights of workers and
consumers by limiting remedies and private rights of actions for a wide range of bad acts by
businesses. See generally Protecting Consumers by Protecting Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008); Short-Change for Consumers and Short-Shrift for Congress?
The Supreme Court's Treatment of Laws that Protect Americans' Health, Safety, Jobs and Retirement:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008); Courting Big Business: The Supreme
Court's Recent Decisions on Corporate Misconduct and Laws Regulating Corporation: Hearing Before the S.




In crafting new legislation, considerations of individual remedies, judicial
enforcement, and possible legal challenges almost inevitably take a back seat to
matters of substance and politics. But following the Rehnquist Court's
"federalism" decisions, inattention to these matters can have a significant and
detrimental effect on the ultimate effectiveness of legislation. Analysis of
GINA, and comparison to the VRA 2006 Reauthorization, ERPA, and ENDA,
suggests that Congress has been inconsistent in its responses to this challenge.
Congress has given the Court's federalist jurisprudence careful attention when
developing high-profile and controversial bills, but not for lower-profile bills.
If Congress is to uphold its prerogatives and ensure the full effectiveness of
federal laws, its response must be more than sporadic. Due consideration must
be given to the federalism hurdles imposed by the Court in developing any
legislation that protects individual rights against state actors; this includes
building a strong evidentiary record, drafting committee reports that address
the Court's precedents, and including specific statutory findings, statements of
purpose, and private remedies. It will also include using Congress's oversight
and nominations powers, as well as participation before the Court itself.
The steps I have suggested may or may not require significant expenditures
of legislative resources or political capital; they will certainly require consistent
attention. Ensuring that widely-accepted laws do not become judicial casualties
must become a routine part of the work of Congress. Otherwise, Congress will
continue to pass important laws like the ADA and GINA - often after years of
work to develop nuanced solutions and build bipartisan support - only to see
their impact blunted by the courts on "federalism" grounds.
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